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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we build a simple model to integrate the findings and/or hypotheses in the diverse 
literatures related to economic development and growth. They include the literature on 
institutions attributed to Douglas North (1990), on entrepreneurs, innovations and technical 
progress attributed to Schumpeter (1934) and on the driving factors of economic growth in 
various theoretical and empirical contributions. The effort results in a comprehensive theory 
that is flexible enough to understand broad strategic lessons from diverse growth experiences 
across country and time. It is also specific enough to reveal the factors, channels, mechanism 
and the key to sustained economic growth. 
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1. Introduction 
It is the incentive structure imbedded in the institutional/organizational structure of economies that has to be the 
key to unraveling the puzzle of uneven and erratic growth.  < Douglas C. North > 
 
It becomes clear that for analyzing the cause and policies for growth, we need to 
have a theoretical framework in which growth is endogenous. That is, it depends on the 
characteristics of institutions and/or environment that govern the costs and benefits of related 
activities. The model must capture the cause of technical progress, otherwise growth will 
finally approach zero due to diminishing marginal productivity and limited resources. In this 
paper, we build a simple model to integrate the findings and/or hypotheses in the diverse 
literatures related to economic development and growth. They include the literature on 
institutions attributed to Douglas North (1990), on entrepreneurs, innovations and technical 
progress attributed to Schumpeter (1934) and on the driving factors of economic growth in 
various theoretical and empirical contributions. The effort results in a comprehensive theory 
that is flexible enough to understand broad strategic lessons from diverse growth experiences 
across country and time. It is also specific enough to reveal the factors, mechanism, channels 
and the key to sustained economic growth. Long-term growth no longer simply driven by R&D, 
human capital or ideas as suggested in the endogenous growth models, it lies deeply in the 
motivation structure which is specific to the economic, cultural, political and social 
environments of each economy.    
Our model introduces several novelties to understand the growth process. One is 
the incorporation of the role of entrepreneurs and tools variety on technical progress in sticky 
competitive markets. The other is modeling the role of institutions in determining people’s 
effort allocation that in turn affect the growth rate of tools variety. The interactions between the 
two sectors generate virtuous or vicious cycle in progression to the long-term equilibrium 
growth rate that is largely determined by four variables/parameters specific to the domestic and 
international environments of an economy. The factors frequently proposed and found to have 
significant effect on economic growth in various studies can be grouped and understood 
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according to their respective effects on the four variables/parameters in the model. The model 
thus provides a powerful organizing framework for analyzing actual growth phenomena and 
formulating growth promoting policies. 
In the next section, we institute some major insights of Schumpeter (1934) related 
to tools variety and the role of entrepreneur into the Cobb-Douglas production function 
(CDOPF). The factors and mechanism determining equilibrium effort allocation, technical 
progress and therefore long-run growth rate are formulated in Section 3. Section 4 discusses 
and illustrates graphically the mechanism and effects of globalization on equilibrium growth 
rate, the possible sources of conditional convergence and the causes of ‘leapfrogging’ 
phenomenon. Some factors and the channels through which they might affect technical 
progress are sketched and tabled in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  The Schumpeterian Cobb-Douglas Production Function (SCDOPF)  
Reviewing the development process across time and country, it is difficult to 
reject empirically that increase in variety of tools/machines/materials adopted in production is 
the necessary and sufficient condition for technological advancements. This assertion is 
popular among historical economists. (among many others, Craft, 2004; Rosenberg, 1976) 
Schumpeter (1934) emphatically distinguishes innovations from inventions. An invention is an 
idea, a sketch or model for a new or improved device, product, process or system. Such 
inventions do not necessarily lead to technical innovations. An innovation in economic sense is 
accomplished only when the first commercial transaction involving the new product or 
production method or device is completed. Schumpeter always stresses the crucial role of 
entrepreneurs in this complex innovative process. As stated in Schumpeter (1934), the carrying 
out of new combinations can no more be a vocation than the making and execution of strategic 
decisions. The entrepreneur’s essential function must always appear mixed up with other kinds 
of activity. However, everyone is an entrepreneur only when he actually carries out new 
combinations. After the insights of Schumpeter (1934) are incorporated into the model, the 
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driving factors and the key to sustained economic growth become much more intuitive and 
straightforward. 
There are two inputs, labor and a set of tools that generate capital service.1 Behind 
the production scene is entrepreneur who is responsible for decision-making, risk-taking and 
most importantly, conducting innovative activities. A representative firm’s output level (Yj ) 
depends on the amount of capital service (Kj) and labor (Lj) employed by the firm j, such that: 
;βα jjj LKY =  with α + β = 1 , and 0 < α < 1 .           (E1)             
In order to introduce the contribution of innovations in production, we follow the approach in 
the product/input variety literature attributed to Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Various tools are 
aggregated by the CES function that gives a positive value to an increase in tools variety in 
generating capital service, such that: 
∑=
i
ijj XK
θθ /1)( ;  with 0 < θ < 1 and, i = 1,…h,… vj .2         (E2) 
The parameter θ governing the elasticity of substitution between the tools is greater than zero 
and less than one. A higher value of θ indicates that the tools (Xij) can be more easily 
substituted for each other in the production of capital services while lower values of θ 
correspond to greater differentiation among the set of tools. The function is similar to Either 
(1982) and analogous to the ways in which Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) and Krugman (1979), among 
others, in their measure of utility obtained from a bundle of differentiated consumer goods.  
The measurement unit of each tool is normalized so that the unit price of each tool 
equals to r. For all output level, profit-maximizing entrepreneur in firm j chooses an optimal 
level of each tool, Xij*, to maximize the value of capital service ∑=
i
ijj XK
θθ /1)( subject to a 
                                                 
1 Man-made tools for enhancing production include simple tools, machines and new materials. Each variety 
provides differentiated services that are combined to generate specific ‘capital service’ for production. 
2 The function is identical to those in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Obviously, the labor service (L) can be treated in 
an identical manner such that labor service depends on a combination of workers with different skills and human 
capital. However, the sacrificed technical detail allows us to simply and compactly formalize important ideas 
about the role entrepreneurs and tools variety in the growth process. 
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given kjC  allocated for capital service with 
k
jC  =∑
i
ijrX . The symmetry implies that all 
tools variety will be employed with equal quantity, such that for all i, Xij* = Xhj* = X*j (r , kjC , 
Vj), with 0
*
<∂
∂
r
X j ; 0
*
>∂
∂
k
j
j
C
X
; 0
*
<∂
∂
j
j
V
X
; where Vj is the number of tools variety exogenously 
given to firm j. Therefore, for all output level, 
∑=
i
ijj XK
θθ /1** ][  = */1 jj XV
θ  ,                     (E3) 
(E3) indicates that the Dixit-Stiglitz capital service function can be decomposed into the 
technology component Vj and the tools component Xj. Capital service now has an exact 
definition. It is an aggregation of the varieties of man-made tools. Moreover, the higher the Vj, 
the higher the productivity of *jK  and the lower the average cost of capital service (Cj
k / *jK ) 
for all Cjk and output level. Substituting *jK  into the production function, we have: 
βαθ
α
j
*
jjj LXVY =  = βα j*jj LXA ; where Aj equals θ
α
jV .              (E4) 
Aggregating the production of n identical firms, we have the aggregate production function: 
βαθ
α
LXVY =  = βα LXA , where A equals θ
α
V ;  and,              (E5) 
             
L
dL
X
dX
V
dV
Y
dY βαθ
α ++=
L
dL
X
dXdv βαθ
α ++=                   (E6) 
where X and L equals to *jnX  and nLj respectively; dv equals dV/V and (α/θ) ≥ 1.3 
After incorporating the insights of Schumpeter (1934), the ‘A’ in the CDOPF is 
proportional to the number of tools variety employed by entrepreneurs as indicated in (E5). 
                                                 
3 From (E3), )11(
C/r
1V
V
K
k
j
21
j
j
*
j −=∂
∂ −
θθ > 0. It indicates that the marginal productivity of a new tools variety to 
capital service is maximized when θ approaches zero. Since the possibilities of innovation are unlimited, 
entrepreneurs are motivated to adopt/invent new tools with the lowest θ to maximize the gain. Market incentives 
therefore automatically generate the tendency to escape the law of diminishing productivity through innovations. 
For simplicity, we drop the star in denoting X. This has no effect on our analyses since the positive effect of Vj on 
Kj* always dominates the negative displacement effect of Vj on Xj*. For more detail discussion, please refer to Mo 
(2010c). 
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Technical progress is equivalent to an increase in the number of tools variety and the key to its 
increase is the level and effectiveness of entrepreneurial activities in conducting 
innovations/new combinations during production.4 Repeated production of the same tools will 
finally exhaust the limited resources while the increase in tools variety is potentially unlimited. 
Sustained economic growth becomes possible when the economy is driven by the increase in 
tools variety adopted by entrepreneurs. 
 
3.  Institution, Technical Progress, Interaction and Growth Mechanism 
Increasing consensus has been reached that institutions are the most important 
factor determining the long-term performance of an economy and are responsible for the rise 
and decline of nations in related literatures. In North (1990, 1994), institution is defined as the 
formal rules (constitutions, statute and common law, regulations, etc.), the informal constraints 
(norms of behavior, conventions, and internally imposed codes of conduct), and the 
enforcement characteristics of each. Institutions thus determine the motivation structure of a 
society and therefore people’s effort allocation decisions. As noted in Tullock (1967) and 
Krueger (1974), among others, in many countries talented people do not become entrepreneurs, 
but join the government, army, organized religion, and other rent-seeking activities because 
these sectors offer the highest rewards. Landes (I969) suggests that the differential allocation 
of talent is one of the reasons why England had the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth 
century but France did not. Magee, Brock and Young (1989) discuss rent seeking in great 
detail and present a model about the allocation of labor between rent seeking and production. 
Baumol (1990) further suggests that the decline and rise of nations such as ancient Rome, early 
China, the Middle Ages and Renaissance are driven by the relative payoffs of the society offers 
to productive activities such as innovation or destructive activities such as rent seeking and 
                                                 
4 In a frictionless competitive market, entrepreneurs will have no incentive to innovate if innovation involves 
positive costs. However, Shell (1973) demonstrates that when competition is sticky, price-taking competitive 
markets can induce and support innovations among firms which are finally imitated by all survived firms. For the 
details, please refer to Mo (2010c). 
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organized crime. The papers related to Acemoglu (1995, 1998, 2001) further enrich the 
literature. In this section, we build a simple model that incorporates the role of 
institutions/motivation structure on people’s efforts allocation and its interaction with the 
technical progress. The outcomes of the interaction determine economic performances across 
countries and time.   
 
3.1  Institutions, Motivation Structure and Effort Allocation 
“…the productive contribution of the society’s entrepreneurial activities varies much more because of their 
allocation between productive activities such as innovation and largely unproductive activities such as rent 
seeking or organized crime. This allocation is heavily influenced by the relative payoffs society offers to such 
activities.”  < Baumol, 1990 > 
 
People allocate their effort hours that can contribute to innovations directly. 
They can also support innovative activities indirectly by providing related services that raise 
the gains or lower the costs of innovative activities. These productive effort hours Hv generate 
the private return of Bv(Hv , Zv). However, the effort hours can also be allocated for 
rent-seeking or other criminal activities which are denoted by Hr with the return of Br(Hr , Zr). 
Their returns are determined by vectors of environmental and institutional factors denoted by 
Zv and Zr respectively. The effort allocation decision of people in an economy is represented by 
the behavior of a typical person. She chooses activities to maximize her utility that depends on 
the money equivalent benefits (M) generated from a combination of the activities:5 
Maximize (Hv): U (M) = U[Bv(Hv , Zv) + Br(He -Hv , Zr)] ;                
where: M = Bv(Hv , Zv) + Br(Hr , Zr) ; He is the fixed total effort hours and He = Hv + Hr ;  
Bv’(Hv , Zv) =
v
v
H
B
∂
∂ = bv (Hv , Zv) > 0, Bv’’< 0 ; Br’ (Hr , Zr) =
r
r
H
B
∂
∂ = br (Hr , Zr) > 0 , Br’’< 0 ; and, 
0>∂
∂
v
v
Z
B
; 0>∂
∂
r
r
Z
B . 
The first order condition of the optimization problem implies that the marginal benefits of Hv 
                                                 
5 For simplicity, the efforts of economic agents may choose productive or destructive activities which have 
positive returns. The rest of the activities are assumed neutral to economic performance and utility. 
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and Hr has to be equal such that
)Z,H(b
)Z,H(b
r
*
rr
v
*
vv = 1.6 This implies Hv* , the utility-maximizing 
level of Hv , is proportional to the relative return between productive and rent-seeking activities, 
such that: 
Hv* = f ( )Z(b
)Z(b
rr
vv ) ; with Hv* + Hr* = He , and  f ’ > 0 ,  f ’’ < 0.      (E7) 
Institutions embody specific motivation structure that is captured by the levels of bv and br. (E7) 
thus incorporates the effect of institution/motivation structure in determining people’s effort 
allocation. In competitive markets, the return of productive efforts is proportional to the wage 
rate (W). The higher the dv in the production sector, the higher the dW/W = dw that raises the 
return of productive efforts relative to the return of rent-seeking efforts.7 Other things being 
equal, higher dv raises bv/br and therefore Hv* through the ‘wage channel’. The determinants of 
Hv* can therefore be decomposed into two components as follow: 
]})dv(dw[
b
b
{H)]Z(
b
b
[H]
)Z(b
)Z(b
[fH
r
vw
vk
r
vo
v
rr
vv*
v +==   
= dv)]Z(
b
b
[H k
r
vo
v ρ+ , with 0< ρ <1 ;                         (E8) 
ρdv is the effort hours induced by dv which captures the effects of technical progress on the 
people’s effort allocation decision. ovH  is the ‘autonomous’ change in the productive effort 
hours driven by ‘non-dv’ factors that are denoted by Zk. Other than the ‘wage channel’ that is 
driven by the increase in real wage, the ρdv channel might also include the higher return to 
investments driven by dv .8    
Numerous contributions suggest and/or identify various factors affecting the bv/br 
ratio. Among many other possibilities, Zk includes corruption, the tax and government 
                                                 
6 The diminishing marginal productivity implies that the second order condition is satisfied. The assumption may 
not be true to a person. To a community as a whole, the assumption is likely to be valid. 
7 In equilibrium, W equals marginal product of labor. (E5) implies that: ln W = (α/θ)lnV + β(β-1)lnL + α ln X . 
The growth rate of W is therefore proportional to dv, such that dw(dv) with dw′ > 0. Higher dv therefore raises the 
relative marginal return of productive activities to rent-seeking activities.  
8 Higher dv raises the level of productive investments when their rates of return increase. For simplicity, we 
assume that the relationship between dv and wvH is linear. Confining ρ to be less than one will guarantee the 
stability of the interaction system between Hv and dv. 
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expenditure structures, the level and types of transfers or subsidies, the level of socio-political 
stability and the quality of infrastructures. (E8) thus captures the effects of 
institutions/motivation structure as well as the rate of technical progress on the allocation of 
people’s efforts which are specific to each country.  
 
3.2.  Technical Progress, Interaction Mechanism and Growth 
“The factors we have listed (innovation, economies of scale, education, capital accumulation, etc.) are not causes 
of growth; they are growth.” < North and Thomas, 1973 > 
 
The next question is what factors determine the growth rate of tools variety in 
an economy. Economic principles and institutional economists suggest that among some other 
factors, it is mainly driven by the effectiveness and level of efforts allocated for 
entrepreneurial/productive activities that directly or supportively contribute to innovations, 
such that:9 
                 dv* (Hv*, Zd , Zf ) = dvo(Zd1 , Zf1 )+ ψ( Zd2 , Zf2) Hv* ,              (E9)             
In (E9), the driving factors on dv* are decomposed into two components: dvo is the growth rate 
of tools variety due to the factors unrelated to Hv* . ψHv* is the growth rate of tools variety 
generated by productive efforts that are endogenously determined by the motivation structure 
and dv as specified in (E8); 0<ψ <1 is the parameter indicating the effectiveness of Hv* on the 
dv. ψ and dv0 are likely to be affected by vectors of international as well as domestic 
environments indicated by (Zd1 , Zf1) and (Zd2 , Zf2) respectively. They include many various 
factors. For instance, Zf1 includes international technical level and advancements, international 
communication and transportation costs, international political stability and effectiveness of 
services provided by international organizations. Zd2 includes the infrastructures favorable to 
productive and innovative activities such as education/training supports and opportunities for 
                                                 
9 Besides the well known historical and institutional literatures, Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) find 
supportive empirical evidences that countries with higher rent-seeking activities have negative feedback effects on 
the growth potential of the economy. For simplicity, we assume all relationships are linearly related. 
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domestic and international exchanges. dv* is thus driven by international as well as domestic 
factors. 
Now we have the simultaneous equations (E8) and (E9) relating Hv and dv. 
Solving for the equations, we have the general equilibrium levels of: 
Hv** = [1/(1 - ψ ρ)] ovH  + [ρ/(1 - ψ ρ )] dvo ; and,            (E10a) 
dv** =  [1/(1 - ψ ρ )] dvo + [ψ/(1 - ψ ρ)] ovH ;                (E10b) 
The solutions indicate that the initial changes in dvo and/or ovH generate cumulative changes on 
both variables. In the historical and institutional economics literatures as well as the 
endogenous growth models, it is commonly suggested that modern economic development 
with sustained technical progress, dv** > 0, occurs only when the institutions protecting 
intellectual property rights were sufficiently well developed such that entrepreneurs could 
capture part of the social returns generated from their innovations. (for instance, North, 1990; 
Romer, 1990) This hypothesis emphasizes the importance of the incentives to professional 
innovators as captured in (E8). However, our model demonstrates that the key for development 
is indicated by (E10b). Sustained growth happens when dv0 > 0 and/or the economy has 
positive ψ and ovH . (E10b) also demonstrates that stagnation, dv** = 0, is rare and difficult to 
most economies. It requires that dvo and ovH (or ψ) equal to zero. Innovations driven by learning 
from doing in production among entrepreneurs and the creative instinct of humankind suggest 
that ψ and ovH  have tendency to be greater than zero. International technical spillovers also 
suggest that dv0 > 0. Therefore, sustained growth is likely to be natural if people have 
economic freedom and operate under proper infrastructures. Long-term stagnation and poverty 
usually happen only when governments/organized powers intentionally destroy knowledge and 
technology periodically and create institutions targeted at suppressing innovative activities in 
order to protect their own vested interests. In fact, the intentional elimination of growth 
possibilities by organized powers through suppressing the key growth parameter and variables 
in (E10b), dvo, ovH and ψ, to zero through policies like prohibiting international exchanges, 
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repressing the spread of technical know-how and instituting deleterious motivation structure is 
well-documented in related literature. (for instance, Mo, 1995 and 2004) 
In order to visualize the virtuous/vicious interactions between dv and Hv, we 
introduce the time element into the simultaneous equation system. The stability requirement of 
the system, its dynamic process and the associated phenomena in the progression towards 
higher or lower growth over time can be observed accordingly. Assume a higher dv induces 
higher contemporary productive efforts through raising the marginal return of the efforts; while 
the growth rate of tools variety in this period depends on the productive efforts of the last 
period, such that: 
Hv*t = ovH + ρ dv*t  ;  and,  dv*t = dvo + ψ Hv*(t-1) . 
Through repeated substitutions, we can observe the progression of the two variables evolving 
towards the steady state as demonstrated in Table 1:10 
 
Table 1: The Cumulative Effect and Mechanism of dv* and Hv* 
 
Time ∆Hv* ∆dv* 
1 1 ψ 
2 ψρ ψ 2ρ 
3 ψ 2ρ 2 ψ 3ρ 2 
4 ψ 3ρ 3 : 
: : : 
∞ 0 0 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Table1 indicates that the initial increase/decrease in Hv* and/or dv* generates cumulative 
changes in both variables over time. The rise of a nation can be understood as an improvement 
in motivation structure that generates cumulative increase in technical progress and productive 
efforts under the virtuous cycle between dv* and Hv*. The process normally also generates 
                                                 
10 The stability of the system requires 1<ψρ that is satisfied when the parameters are assumed to be less than one 
and greater than zero. Solving the equations, we can have the difference equations of the respective variables. 
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induced improvements in infrastructures and institutions when production surplus and standard 
of living improves. Similarly, a nation declines when it experiences institutional degradation 
and therefore simultaneous declines in technical progress and productive efforts generated by 
the vicious cycle between dv* and Hv*.  
 
 4.  Effects of Globalization, Sources of Conditional Convergence and Leapfrogging 
Graphical analyses are more effective to visualize the interaction mechanism 
and the factors determining the equilibrium technical progress or equivalently, the rate of 
sustained economic growth across countries and time. In Figure 1, we use the model to analyze 
the effects of globalization. The effects of institutional degradation in an economy are 
illustrated in Figure 2. Figure 3 provides a mechanism for conditional convergence due to the 
‘hungry and lean effect’ and Figure 4 demonstrates another reason for conditional convergence. 
The sources of conditional convergence can explain the leapfrogging phenomenon when the 
Olson’s (1982) hypothesis of ‘cumulative distortions’ is incorporated.  
Globalization raises the extent of market as well as renders international 
exchanges in tools variety and organization methods available to entrepreneurs. (for instance, 
Mo, 2010a) The expansion of tools variety through international exchanges raises dvo as well 
as ψ ,  the productivity of productive efforts. This results in a virtuous cycle driving the 
economy from the low level equilibrium (dv1**, Hv1**) towards a higher level equilibrium (dv2**, 
Hv2**) as illustrated in Figure 1. The process can help us to understand the successful stories of 
some East Asian countries that sequentially liberalize their economies to capture the benefits of 
globalization generated from the expansion of tools variety. (Mo, 2010b) 
 
Insert Figure 1 & 2 about here 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the effects generated by institutional degradation in an economy. 
The degradation is equivalent to the decline in relative benefits of productive activities to 
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rent-seeking activities as well as a decrease in the marginal return to productive, innovative and 
investment activities. The reduction in
r
v
b
b  results in a lower ovH (
r
v
b
b ) while the decrease in 
marginal return to productive activities results in lower ρ. They generate a vicious cycle 
driving the economy from a high level equilibrium (dv1**, Hv1**) to a low level equilibrium 
(dv2**, Hv2**). 
 
dv*
Hv*0
dvo1
Hv0
Hv* = Hv0 + ρ dv*
dv1* = dvo1 + ψ1 Hv*
dv1**
Hv1**
dv2* = dvo2 + ψ2 Hv*
dvo2
Hv2**
dv2**
Figure 1: Globalization: Both dvo and ψ increase
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dv*
Hv*0
dvo
Hv01
Hv1* = Hv1o + ρ1 dv*
dv1** dv
* = dvo + ψ Hv*
dv2**
Hv2* = Hv2o + ρ2dv*
Hv1**Hv2
**Hvo2
Figure 2: Degradation of Institutions: Hvo and ρ Decreases
 
dv*
Hv*0
dvo
Hv0
Hv1* = Hvo + ρ1 dv*
dv1** dv* = dvo + ψ Hv*
dv2**
Hv2* = Hvo + ρ2dv*
Hv1**Hv2
**
Figure 3: ‘Hungry and Lean’ versus ‘Full and Fat’
Note: Hungry and lean people tend to be more ‘opportunistic’: with higher ρ.
(Hungry)
(Full)
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dv*
Hv*0
dvo1
Hv0
Hv* = Hv0 + ρ dv*
dv1* = dvo1 + ψ1 Hv*
dv1**
Hv1**
dv2* = dvo2 + ψ2 Hv*
Hv2**
dv2**
Figure 4: Catch-up by Imitations
Note: Lagged economies have higher dvo and ψ as imitation is easier than invention.
(Lagged economy)
(Leading economy)
dvo2
 
Conditional convergence has strong empirical regularity in the data on countries and regions as 
suggested in Barro (1998), among many other findings. Figure 3 and 4 provide two possible 
channels for conditional convergence to occur. Figure 3 illustrates that driven by hunger, basic 
needs and desires, poor people are eager to grab opportunities and benefits to improve their 
wellbeing. When other things being equal, these economies tend to be more ‘opportunistic’ 
with higher ρ and therefore have higher equilibrium Hv and dv.  
Insert Figure 3 & 4 about here 
Figure 4 provides another possibility for the conditional convergence. Lower 
income countries normally have low level of technology or equivalently, with less tools variety. 
Since imitation and/or importation of advance tools are much less costly than acquiring them 
by R&D, lagged economies tend to have higher dv0 and ψ than advanced economies when 
other things being equal. This can result in higher dv** in lagged economies than the leading 
economies when they have comparable quality of public governance. The insight on 
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‘cumulative distortions’ suggests that old developed countries tend to have more distortions in 
the bureaucratic decision process. (Olson, 1982) Therefore, lower quality of public governance 
and motivation structure in old developed economies resulted in lower ovH  and ρ than those 
newly-developed economies. 11  After developing economies catch-up with the leading 
economies through the two ‘conditional convergence channels’, the less cumulative distortions 
in newly-developed economies, or equivalently, the better motivation structure, generates 
higher (dv**, Hv**) as shown in Figure 2. The mechanisms result in the ‘leapfrogging’ 
phenomenon commonly observed in the rise and decline of nations across time.12  
 
5.  The Key, Channels and Factors for Sustained Economic Growth 
To summarize, the key for any technical progress is the increase in tools variety 
that are driven by the level and effectiveness of entrepreneurial activities while the channels of 
every factor affecting technical progress can be separated into two categories and four groups: 
Motivation Category: 
Group M1: The factors Zk that determines ovH  through 
o
vH [
r
v
b
b (Zk)]. For instance, the 
government expenditure and tax structures, level of corruption and distribution of 
opportunities. 
Group M2: The factors determine the productive efforts induced by dv 
                                                 
11 The empirical study in Mo (2009) finds that minimum wage has cumulative negative effects on productivity, 
investment and growth. Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006) and Michau (2009), among others, also provide some 
evidences and the possible sources of ‘cumulative distortions’ as suggested in Olson (1982). The empirical 
observations and the causes of leapfrogging suggested in this paper are therefore mutually supportive. 
12 As noted in Brezis, Krugman, and Tsiddon (1993), endogenous growth theory fails to explain the historical 
evidences that the role of international leadership among countries shifts. They suggest a mechanism that explains 
this pattern of ‘leapfrogging’ as a response to occasional major changes in technology. When the new technology 
proves more productive than the old, leapfrogging of leadership occurs. With the insight of Olson (1982) and the 
conditional convergence literature, our model provides the alternative mechanism in explaining this common 
observation. 
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through )]}dv(dw[
b
b
{H
r
vw
v . They include the size of market, stock of human capital, tax and 
expenditure structure, resources mobility and government supports to entrepreneurial activities. 
In general, they include all factors determining the motivation and effectiveness of the 
economic agents in reacting to the opportunities and challenges generated by dv. 
Technical Category: 
Group T1: The factors denoted by (Zf1 , Zd1) that drive the autonomous growth rate of tools 
variety through dvo(Zf1 , Zd1). They include spillovers generated by technical progress of 
foreign countries, distance to the sea and trade policies that determine the intensity of 
international exchanges. 
Group T2: The factors denoted by ( Zd2 , Zf2) that determine ψ( Zd2 , Zf2), the marginal 
productivity of Hv on the growth rate of tools variety. They include the infrastructures and 
government supports available to innovative activities as well as the international and domestic 
exchange opportunities.  
Table 2 lists some factors that are commonly considered to have effects on 
economic growth in related literatures. Employing our analytical framework, we suggest the 
possible channels and directions through which they effect on the rate of technical progress and 
therefore economic growth. The suggestions are only tentative as the actual effects of a policy 
can be highly specific to initial conditions of each country. (for instance, Mo, 2010b) Moreover, 
we do not discuss the details on the mechanism although readers can always refer to some 
related works and find analogies in the graphical analyses as presented in the last section. 
However, the nice thing of our framework is that the effects of all factors on long-run 
economic growth can always be judged by their final impacts on the growth of tools and its 
variety adopted by entrepreneurs in their production process. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
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Table 2: Factors and Channels affecting Technical Progress and Growth 
Channels Affecting Technical Progress and Growth Growth Factors   
)]Z(
b
b
[H k
r
vo
v =
 
)dv(
)H( *v
∂
∂=ρ dv
o(Zd1 , Zf1) 
vH
)dv(
∂
∂ =ψ 
Economic freedom and factors mobility + + + + 
International exchanges & competition1 + + + + 
Rewards contingent on productive activities + + + + 
Exploitative government2 − − − − 
Corruption3 − − − − 
Financial system efficiency + + + + 
Education supports6, 7 + + + + 
Lack of access to sea − − − − 
Logographic writing system4 + + + + 
Ethnic and religious conflicts − − − − 
Private property rights protection + + + 0 
Stock of human capital5 0 + + + 
Ex-ante opportunity inequality6 − − 0 − 
Taxing land rent and other unearned incomes6 + + + 0 
Government Consumption/tax rate7 − − − 0 
Aggregate demand sufficiency7 + + + 0 
Urbanization and industrial cluster 0 + + + 
Intellectual property right protection + + + 0 
Per capita GDP / technology level 0 0 − − 
Intensity of political activities8 − − 0 0 
Tropical climate − − 0 0 
Increase in foreign dv 0 0 + + 
Notes: 
Please refer to the following papers for some related discussions, among many others: 1 Mo(2010a, 2010b); 2 Mo(1995, 2004); 
3 Mo(2001a); ; 4 Mo (2007a, 2008a); 5 Mo(2002); 6(2000, 2003, 2009a); 7 Mo (2007c); 8 Mo(2001b, 2007b, 2009b). 
 
Now, we have a model that captures the key, channels and mechanism of technical progress 
and long-term growth. The rise of European economies experienced in recent centuries can be 
understood as a virtuous cycle between technical progress, productive activities, production 
surplus and the institutional factors driving technical progress. Unlike the situation in imperial 
China, the intense inter-country competitions in the European continent forced the dictators to 
adopt institutions favorable and supportive to entrepreneurial activities, technical progress and 
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economic growth. (for instance, Jones, 1981) Under the environment, the invention and 
adoption of mechanical energy in production lowered transportation cost that raised the market 
size as well as the intensity of international interactions and competitions. Also, increase in 
production surplus allowed increasing scale of infrastructures, urban clusters and investments, 
raising the stock of human capital and releasing the resources for survival activities to 
innovative ventures. They generated a virtuous circle of explosion in tools variety that kicked 
start the industrial revolution. The globalization process along with intense competitions and 
increased market size further the dynamism towards global explosion in tools and its variety. 
 
6.  Conclusion: Economics is a ‘BullsMo’ Science 
The cause of sustained economic growth and development is one of the most 
important issues in economics. How can we explain the immense differences in income and 
technical progress across the world? What can policy do about it? In this paper, we construct a 
simple model to link up some important insights of Schumpeter (1934) with the contributions 
from the literatures relating to institutions, endogenous growth theories and empirical findings 
on growth determinants. The model provides clear answers and mechanism for the above 
important questions. Tools variety increase is the only key for technical progress which is 
observable, endogenously determined and interacts with people’s effort allocation decisions. 
While the key and channels to sustained economic growth are narrowly defined, the model is 
general enough to understand various driving factors and mechanism that explain sustained 
growth, growth explosion, decline and stagnation across economies and time. International 
competition becomes the competition on the quality of public governance. It determines the 
quality of institutions/motivation structure, public policies and infrastructures supportive to 
entrepreneurial activities and therefore the growth rate of tools variety.13 Empowered with the 
framework, policymakers now have the precise target and instructions that are short, clear and 
                                                 
13 Mo (2007c) provides some supportive evidences on this conclusion. The structure of public expenditures that 
largely capture the quality of public governance and determine the motivation structure facing economic agents in 
an economy can explain more than 80 percent of the long-term growth rate across countries. 
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easy to implement. It condenses the findings and suggestions by many books and articles into a 
one single target: instituting appropriate motivation structure, policies and supports that are 
favorable to entrepreneurs for expanding the tools and its variety in their production process. 
Standing on the shoulders of the giants, we transform a ‘dismal science’ that 
describes a world of scarcity, stagnation, decline and diminishing returns into a discipline that 
shows unlimited possibilities. Our model suggests that zero growth occurs only under very 
specific conditions. When self-interest maximizing agents interact under appropriate 
environments, entrepreneurs are automatically motivated to escape the law of diminishing 
productivity by innovations. The potential virtuous cycle between technical progress, 
productive activities and favorable infrastructures can generate a ‘Bulls Momentum’ that opens 
up the possibility of progressive and sustained economic growth. This suggests that economics 
is no longer a dismal science but a ‘BullsMo’ science that can potentially bring us to an earthly 
paradise.  
This study supports the insight attributed to North (1990) where he argues that 
the central issue of economic history and of economic development is to account for the 
evolution of political and economic institutions that create an economic environment 
determining the increase/decline in productivity. Only with the knowledge, we are able to 
devise constraints and infrastructures for political, economic and social interactions such that 
the entrepreneurial vitality and therefore the growth of tools variety can forever be sustained. 
Will the development of humankind finally hit the carrying capacity of the earth? May be yes. 
Will we finally reach the carrying capacity of the universe? I do not know. But with the 
unlimited possibilities of tools variety and unlimited creativity among humankind societies, the 
chance is very slim. The BullsMo framework in this paper suggests that we have no destined 
ending. Our ending depends on whether we can instill desirable motivation structure into our 
societies. It is embodied in our public policies, organizations, economic and social 
infrastructures that are predominantly affected by the quality of public governance. They are 
ultimately dependent on our knowledge, vision, wisdom, choices and determination. 
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